The First World War was an unprecedented catastrophe that killed millions and set the continent of Europe on the path to further calamity two decades later . But it did n’t come out of nowhere . With the centenary of the outbreak of hostilities coming up in August , Erik Sass will be looking back at the lead - up to the warfare , when seemingly modest moments of rubbing collect until the billet was quick to explode . He ’ll be covering those events 100 twelvemonth after they pass off . This is the 115th installment in the series .

2 December 2024: French Finalize War Plan with Fatal Flaws

In April 1913 , the chieftain of the French cosmopolitan staff , Joseph Joffre , presented the basic elements of his programme for war with Germany to the Supreme War Council . In its broad outlines , Plan XVII ( so - called because it was the seventeenth warfare plan acquire by the council ) imagine a vigorous offensive by four Gallic Army ranged along the Franco - German frontier , with one ground forces hold in reserve for follow - up flak . The Supreme War CouncilapprovedPlan XVII shortly thereafter , and over the next year Joffre flesh it out with general directives for each of the five armies . On May 1 , 1914 , the denominate commanders received their final order under Plan XVII .

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Furthest south , the French First Army under General Auguste Dubail would hit east from an area straddling the headwaters of the Moselle River , near Epinal , into southern Alsace , one of the “ lost responsibility ” annex by Germany following its victory over France in 1871 . Meanwhile , the Second Army under Noël Édouard de Castelnau , start around Nancy , would move northeast into Lorraine , the other “ fall behind province , ” in the oecumenical direction of Sarrebrücke . This thrust would be supported by the Third Army under Pierre Ruffey , heading due east from Verdun towards Metz . Meanwhile the Fourth Army under Fernand de Langle de Cary would be held in backlog Benjamin West of St. Mihiel as a “ masse de manoeuvre , ” to be thrown into battle to work orifice create by the overture of the 2d and Third Armies , as Joffre saw fit . Finally the Fifth Army , under General Charles Lanrezac , was left alone in the due north to face whatever German force might advance through Belgium , to be followed by an feeler into Luxembourg and maybe even Germany itself .

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As this oftentimes equivocal diction suggests , Plan XVII was not a detailed programme of movement , but rather a general scheme for militarisation and immersion that also contemplated some canonical orifice moves . Joffre , who in full realized that war is irregular , intend Plan XVII to be flexible , earmark improvisation to reply to the foeman ’s social movement . But even in outline this scheme had calamitous flaw .

First of all , Joffre — like most other European generals of his Clarence Shepard Day Jr. — believed that bold offensive were the keystone to victory , enshrining relentless all - out onrush ( offensive à outrance ) as a sacred principle ; according to this panorama , troops could overcome any obstacle as long as they were sufficiently soak with intangible qualities of spirit and will . Thus Plan XVII opened , “ Whatever the circumstance , it is the Commander - in - Chief ’s aim to promote with all forces united to the attack of the German armies , ” and the Gallic infantry regulations adopted on April 20 , 1914 declare that French troops would reach the best results by rushing the enemy and relying on their bayonet for hand - to - hired man combat , adding , “ the French Army has returned to its quondam traditions , and no longer recognizes any law in the conduct of operations but that of the offensive . ” But the French , along with the rest of Europe , were about to learn that their “ law ” hold no sway on the modern battlefield , where political machine guns , setose conducting wire , speedy - ardor rifles , and heavy ordnance made mincemeat of man ’s valor .

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Even worse , Plan XVII simulate that any German attack through Belgium would be confine to the country ’s southeast corner , advancing on Sedan in northerly France , the scene of the decisive Prussian triumph in 1870 . This Assumption of Mary was question by Joseph Gallieni , the original commander of the Fifth Army designated to face the Germans in Belgium , who right predicted that their invasion would reach much further Second Earl of Guilford and Occident , communicate by Namur and Dinant , allowing them to threaten French forces with a immense envelopment from behind ; however Joffre refused to shift the Gallic armies west to front the threat , and Gallieni finally resigned in protestation . Tellingly , Joffre ’s first choice to interchange Gallieni , General Alexis Hargon , refused to command the Fifth Army on the same curtilage .

Charles Lanrezac , who ended up accepting the command , was no more convinced in Plan XVII ’s scheme of concentration , echoing Gallieni ’s suggestion that Fifth Army and at least some other French forces should be deploy further west along the Belgian boundary line to anticipate a German intrusion in depth . Lanrezac also criticise the decision to ship Fifth Army into southeast Belgium , noting in a varsity letter to Joffre , “ Clearly , once the Fifth Army is practice to an offensive in the direction of Neufchateau it will be unable to parry a German offence further Union . ”

Considering his earlier obstinacy towards Gallieni and Hargon , it ’s extremely unlikely that Joffre would have given Lanrezac ’s fear any listening , even in peacetime . But by the time he welcome Lanrezac ’s letter , on August 1 , 1914 , warfare was upon them and it was too late for revision anyway . In the workweek that followed Joffre ’s stubborn refusal to present the facts — specially evidence of a massive German encroachment through northern and central Belgium — would bring France to the threshold of disaster .

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